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that people were more comfortable sharing 
more, and that Facebook was merely re-
flecting the current social norms. The more 
people shared online, the more personal 
data tech companies could collect, the more 
they could personalise ads and content, the 
more they could influence users’ behaviour, 
the more users engaged, the more ads they 
could sell. 
Then came the privacy scandals. Almost 
every week for the past few years, privacy has 
been a major news headline. Data breach af-
ter data breach, cases of data collected with-
out consent, legal and illegal data misuses. 
Users’ passwords getting published, people 
being extorted, data brokers using people’s 
most sensitive information (that they were 
rape victims, that they were impotent, that 
they were AIDS patients) to sell their pro-
files to the highest bidder. Perhaps the pin-
nacle of the privacy disasters saga was the 
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During the past two decades, privacy has 
been a fierce battle ground. At the begin-
ning of the century, newly founded tech 
companies like Google started the fight by 
establishing a novel business model based 
on surveillance. Our personal data became 
the golden nuggets of the digital era. But it 
would be years before ordinary citizens real-
ised the deal they had struck when they had 
“agreed” to indecipherable, extensive, and 
constantly changing terms of service. Once 
we realised the extent to which our data was 
being collected and analysed, it seemed like 
it was too late to recall it, and many public 
voices declared the death of privacy.  
Recovering privacy seemed all the more 
impossible given governments’ support of 
corporate surveillance. The data economy 
became a way to enhance the information 
capabilities of intelligence agencies, which 
were looking to increase their power after 
the trauma of the terrorist attacks on the 
Twin Towers in the United States in 2001. 
From the start, the surveillance economy has 
sprung from and been sustained by coopera-
tion between corporations and governments. 
Tech companies were only too happy to 
echo the discourse on the death of privacy. 
It was a narrative that was good for busi-
ness. In 2010, Mark Zuckerberg suggested 
that privacy social norms had “evolved”, 
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Cambridge Analytica data scandal, revealed 
in 2018. The British data firm had used 
the personal data of over 87 million users 
to build psychographic profiles of voters 
around the world in order to design person-
alised political propaganda and sway elec-
tions. Cambridge Analytica helped both the 
Trump presidential campaign in the United 
States and the Leave campaign in the Brexit 
referendum in the United Kingdom.  
Citizens responded to the privacy scan-
dals with what has been described as a 
“techlash”. Tech companies whose business 
model depends on surveillance were no lon-
ger perceived as the good guys in hoodies 
who were here to make our world a better 
place. They were data predators that were 
jeopardising, not only individuals’ privacy 
and security, but also democracy itself. Reg-
ulators turned their attention towards priva-
cy, implementing the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation in Europe, the California 
Consumer Privacy Act, and discussing a 
possible federal law in the United States, 
among other regulatory initiatives. Privacy 
turned out to be far from dead.  
Then came the pandemic.  
 
Power shifts 
The coronavirus pandemic has aggravated 
power asymmetries that were being chal-
lenged before the world went into lock-
down. Before the pandemic, resistance was 
building against tech companies’ hegemony. 
Against, for instance, terms of agreement 
that do not give users meaningful options 
and can change at any time. The pandemic, 
however, gave tech companies new leverage. 
From the time tech companies like 
Facebook and Google became big tech, the 
option of not using them has been some-
what of a fiction. Tech enthusiasts have 
pointed out time and again that if users are 
unhappy about these services, they should 
simply opt-out of them. There are two 
main reasons why opting-out is not a mean-
ingful alternative.  
First, the cost of not using services that 
have become as necessary as utilities is inor-
dinately high, both personally and profes-
sionally. Not using Facebook can mean los-
ing hundreds of relationships, and missing 
out on crucial professional opportunities. 
Not using Google can amount to a compet-
itive disadvantage -- from getting lost in an 
unfamiliar city on the way to a job interview, 
to not having access to research tools such 
as Google Scholar that are being used by 
one’s colleagues. When a platform becomes 
as dominant as Facebook and Google are, 
asking someone not to use it amounts to 
asking them to exclude themselves from be-
ing full participants in their society. 
Second, even if you try your best to avoid 
Facebook and Google, they’re unavoidable. 
Google ads, and their trackers, for instance, 
are plastered throughout most of the inter-
net. Facebook has a shadow profile on you 
even if you’ve never had an account with 
them. Your sacrifice ends up feeling useless. 
Before the pandemic, however, there 
was more of an option to resist using tech 
services -- even if there was a high cost to 
pay, and even if one were still tracked by 
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them to a certain extent. During lockdown, 
that narrow possibility became even nar-
rower, and any illusion of voluntariness in 
the use of technology has vanished.  
For most people who have had to en-
dure lockdown, the pandemic has made 
technology even more pervasive and inev-
itable. Being online and using videoconfer-
encing apps became necessary for any and 
all social interaction beyond the walls of our 
homes. Key workers had to risk their lives 
by continuing to work outside their homes. 
Everyone else had to use online tools to get 
an education, work, interact with family, get 
medical attention, enjoy some much-need-
ed entertainment, and more.  
Thus, some of the techlash has been 
watered down by a combination of feeling 
grateful that we have technology that can 
allow us to stay in touch with others even 
while in lockdown, and resignation that 
boycotting tech seems less of an option than 
ever. Big tech’s stocks have been consistent-
ly on the rise during the pandemic, in cor-
relation with their accumulated power.   
Dependence on smartphones and tech 
platforms is widespread. It’s not only citizens 
depending on gadgets and apps to continue 
their studies or perform their jobs. Even 
businesses, universities, health services, and 
governments depend on these platforms to 
carry out their everyday functions. These 
institutions do not have platforms of their 
own. Government and diplomatic meetings 
around the world are being carried out on 
platforms such as Zoom and Teams. Univer-
sities cannot fully guarantee the privacy of 
their students because they do not control 
the platforms they use. Often, governments 
cannot be certain of the confidentiality of 
their meetings for the same reason.  
There are, however, a few avenues of 
resistance and sources of friction that are 
proving crucial to protect privacy in these 
challenging times.  
 
Avenues of resistance 
Although resisting tech during lockdown 
is extremely hard, confinement could not 
last forever. There was an urgent economic 
need to resume more productive lifestyles 
as soon as possible. Once analogue life re-
sumes its course, the possibilities for avoid-
ing particular apps or technologies multiply. 
Soon after lockdown began, govern-
ments around the world proposed a va-
riety of contact-tracing apps as a possible 
solution to emerge from confinement in 
a safer way. Tech companies were quick 
to jump at the opportunity, offering their 
services to support this effort. But the dis-
trust cultivated by years of misuses of data 
had taken its toll. Citizens, privacy experts, 
and concerned organisations sounded their 
alarms. Having learnt from the experience 
after 9/11, political commentators warned 
about “temporary” measures becoming en-
trenched. Enlisting experts’ support was 
important because, unless governments 
were willing to try their luck at making 
the use of these apps mandatory -- risking 
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contact with someone who has been diag-
nosed with Covid-19.   
The choice between centralised and 
decentralised apps became the arena of 
the latest privacy feud. Apple and Goo-
gle teamed up to build an API (application 
programming interface) to support decen-
tralised contact-tracing apps, which meant 
that centralised apps were not going to work 
properly on iPhones and Androids. Given 
that the vast majority of people who have 
smartphones have one or the other brand, 
the UK was forced to change their approach 
to a decentralised app.  
For citizens, the good news was that the 
tech giants protected their privacy better 
than might have been expected, given the 
track record of a company like Google. The 
bad news was that this power struggle made 
it obvious how big tech companies have 
more power than governments, and are 
often treated as if they were governments 
themselves. Tech users around the world are 
at the mercy of undemocratic and largely 
unaccountable corporations. It’s great when 
they protect our privacy, but it’s extremely 
bad news when they don’t, and Google’s 
business model still depends on personal 
data. That we have to trust the good will of 
giant corporations for our right to privacy 
to be respected is far from ideal. 
The first avenue of resistance, then, 
came about as a result of the need to secure 
trust from the population in the post-lock-
down world. One of the positive effects of 
the techlash before the pandemic hit was 
sabotage or rebellion from the population 
– they had to secure citizens’ cooperation 
and trust. People have to download and use 
the app for it to work. Had governments 
and tech companies been more trustworthy 
with personal data in the past two decades, 
cooperation for the sake of public health 
could have been much more successful.  
But experts had doubts about how use-
ful such contact-tracing apps would be in 
the first place, given the difference between 
electronic “contacts” and infections. Apps 
allow for false positives, when two people 
seem to be in contact from the point of view 
of their phones but in fact are separated by a 
wall. Apps also invite false negatives, as they 
cannot record infections contracted from 
contaminated surfaces or from a contact be-
tween people who didn’t have their phones 
on them, or who had too fleeting a contact 
to be recorded as such by the app. That apps 
were receiving so much attention – as op-
posed to efforts to produce more protective 
equipment, sanitising products, etc. – was 
questionable.  
There were also doubts about how much 
data was necessary for an app to be useful. 
The United Kingdom’s National Health 
Service, for instance, first championed a 
centralised approach according to which 
data would be sent to a centralised data-
base from which networks of relationships 
and contacts could be gleaned. In contrast, 
decentralised apps are designed to process 
data in people’s phones. Although the lat-
ter approach is less informative to health 
authorities (e.g. they cannot know who is 
suspected of infection, or who has been in 
contact with whom), it is much more pro-
tective of privacy, and equally effective at 
alerting people who might have been in 
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government surveillance. From that point of 
view, it is a good sign when there is disagree-
ment between big tech and governments, as 
in the case of the debate between centralised 
and decentralised contact-tracing apps. The 
coronavirus pandemic, however, has brought 
new alliances between tech companies and 
governments that are concerning.  
Tech billionaire and former Google 
CEO Eric Schmidt has argued for “unprec-
edented partnerships between government 
and industry”. Palantir, the controversial 
CIA-backed company that collaborated in 
the United States’ surveillance programme, 
is now involved with both the United King-
dom’s National Health Service and the 
United States’ Department of Health and 
Human Services, as well as the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention. The 
NHS gave Palantir all kinds of data about 
patients, employees, and members of the 
public, from contact information to details 
of gender, race, work, physical and mental 
health conditions, political and religious af-
filiation, and past criminal offences. Palantir 
first charged the NHS just £1 for its services 
– in return, Palantir was granted intellectual 
property rights and access to valuable data 
to train their models. The company later 
secured a £1 million contract with the NHS 
for a coronavirus “data store”. 
Prominent among the many privacy 
the proliferation of privacy-friendly (or 
friendlier) alternatives, which is the second 
resource for resistance. Privacy is some-
thing that can sell, an edge that can give a 
company competitive advantage. The more 
privacy the competition offers, the more 
other businesses are willing to cave to public 
pressures that call for more privacy.  
End-to-end encryption, for instance, is 
slowly becoming an expected standard of 
cybersecurity. When it was revealed that 
Zoom did not offer end-to-end encryption 
despite claiming it did, the scandal led to the 
company promising such encryption. Zoom 
then announced it would only offer the add-
ed security to paid accounts. The public 
criticism quickly made the company com-
mit to end-to-end encryption for all users.  
Privacy-friendly tech empowers netizens 
first, by protecting their personal data; second, 
by providing meaningful options to dominant 
and privacy-unfriendly tech; and third, by 
pushing big tech towards offering more priva-
cy protections to remain competitive.  
But as long as big tech remains as dom-
inant as it is today, privacy-friendly alter-
natives will not be able to compete on an 
equal footing on account of network effects 
(everyone wants to be in the most popular 
platform because that is where everyone else 
is), and decades of big tech having hoarded 
personal data (which helps platforms sell 
personalised ads and have more accurate al-
gorithms), among other factors. 
Challenges ahead 
When tech companies and governments 
form a unified surveillance front, citizens 
are overpowered – they cannot count on 
governments to protect them from compa-
nies nor on companies to protect them from 
113
Privacy During the Pandemic and Beyond 
away anonymity, is particularly dangerous 
to our privacy. At the time of writing, there 
are protests on both sides of the Atlantic 
over racial injustice. Can protestors be sure 
that they are protesting anonymously, giv-
en how common facial recognition has be-
come? Can they be sure that participating 
(peacefully and legally) in a demonstration 
will not make them vulnerable to being 
targeted by the police? What about all the 
footage from our innumerable video calls? 
Can we be sure that facial recognition is not 
being used on those?  
Our privacy should not be a bargaining 
chip. Our personal data should not be the 
kind of thing that can be bought, sold, or 
used against us by institutions that are sup-
posed to be our data custodians. Institutions 
that violate people’s privacy should face se-
rious enough consequences that they regret 
having done so. There is a long way ahead of 
us in making governments and corporations 
accountable in matters of privacy. But that 
institutions found resistance to data grabs 
even during the worst of times, when we 
were a captive audience made vulnerable by 
the pandemic, gives us reason for optimism.
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challenges citizens face in the wake of the 
pandemic, then, are corporate data deals 
with governments that might solidify wide-
spread surveillance as a condition to access 
basic services and opportunities.  
One of the things we lose when our pri-
vacy is jeopardised is autonomy – our abili-
ty to self-govern, both as individuals and as 
democracies. An important contribution of 
medical ethics was giving more autonomy 
to patients. As the deal between the NHS 
and Palantir shows (another infamous sim-
ilar deal was between the NHS and Deep-
Mind in 2016), patients’ autonomy is being 
compromised by breaches in confidentiality. 
NHS patients are not being asked for the 
consent to transfer their data to corpora-
tions that are not health professionals and 
do not have patients’ best interests as their 
main objective. The loss of autonomy in 
the medical context is happening in society 
more generally as a result of ubiquitous sur-
veillance.  
Privacy is important because the lack 
of it gives others power over us. If corpo-
rations and governments know who we are, 
what we fear, what we desire, whom we 
sleep next to, what motivates us, they can 
more easily influence our behaviour, as the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal illustrates. 
They can also discriminate against us – for 
our gender, race, genetic makeup, medical 
history, or ideas – without us ever knowing 
about it. And they can use our data to build 
tools that can later oppress us.  
Companies such as Clearview AI, for 
example, have used the photographs that 
we have shared online to train their facial 
recognition algorithms, often without our 
knowledge or consent. Facial recognition, 
along with other technologies that strip 
